

Why Good Leaders Can't Use Good Advice

Rex C. Mitchell

California State University, Northridge

Don Rossmore

Rossmore Associates

Executive Summary

There is an abundance of good advice on what leaders and organizations need, but there are fundamental reasons why they can not implement the advice. Knowing what to do and what structural features are desirable may be necessary, but are not sufficient for leaders to use the advice successfully. Leaders need to develop new internal programming to replace the innate, pervasive programming that prohibits even good leaders from implementing good advice. Their double-bind is that the internal programming shared by all not only keeps them from successfully using good advice, but it also keeps them from examining or questioning their own thinking. This unawareness seals them off from making the necessary, internal changes. This paper describes a process by which leaders can develop an improved internal framework and use it in practice, despite the self-sealing features of their old programming.

About the Authors: Rex Mitchell, Ph.D., is Professor of Management at California State University, Northridge, president of his consulting firm, and a principal in the Center for Leadership Development. His thirty years of consulting and twenty years of management experience have involved a wide range of organizations. Don Rossmore, Ph.D., is president of Rossmore and Associates, a Los Angeles-based consulting firm that provides services related to management of strategic level organizational change. During twenty years of full-time consulting practice he has worked with senior executives in a wide variety of companies plus non-profit and government organizations.

The best advice available to leaders, managers, and executives makes good sense, for example: build trust, empower people, be tough and participatory, face reality, care for others. These are examples of what could be called behavioral advice. There is a second set of good advice prevalent today, which could be called structural advice, although the two sets overlap; for example: design the organization around customer needs and expectations, flatten the structure, increase use of virtual organizations. Table 1 gives representative examples of advice offered to leaders-grouped into *behavioral*, including advice by Bennis (1997), Blanchard (1999), Covey (1989, 1994), Drucker (1999), Kanter (1997), Kouzes & Posner (1995, 1999), Lawler & colleagues (1995, 2000), O'Reilly & Tushman (1997), Peters (1997), Senge (1999), Tichy (1997), and Vaill (1998), and *structural*, drawn from various sources including Galbraith (1995), Hammer & Champy (1993), Lawler (2000), Mintzberg (1997, 1998), and Nadler & Tushman (1998, 1999).

Table 1: Representative Examples of Current Good Advice

Behavioral Advice	Structural Advice
1. Build trust and credibility 2. Empower everyone 3. Be tough and participatory 4. Face reality and be adaptive 5. Be open and honest 6. Exhibit care and concern for others 7. Manage conflict creatively 8. Create a vision and translate it into reality	9. Stress time-based competition (although quality and cost are still important) 10. Align all aspects of the organization with customer needs and expectations 11. Increase use of virtual (network) organizations 12. Move toward distributed organizations and flatter structures, with lateral links and processes 13. Decentralize decision making 14. Create information-rich organizations with shared information widely available 15. Use flexible sourcing 16. Realize that all organization designs must be fluid and transitory

All of this advice makes good sense to us, as well as to our clients. The behavioral advice makes sense intuitively, in ways few of us question. It is consistent with our deepest and most cherished social values, which we have inherited from the time we could walk, if not before. Both sets of advice, behavioral and structural, make use of the collective experience of leaders and organizations and are responsive to the turbulent environments they face. Our economic environment is growing and fragmenting at an increasing rate. We must innovate and implement faster. This requires developing high performance teams faster and reforming teams more frequently. We must learn faster, and deeper, to keep up. This requires learning from conflict and mistakes. We must achieve ever finer tolerances in our communication and coordination. Most of the advice, given to respond to such challenges, is good.

Dilemmas Inherent in the Best Advice Offered to Leaders

Unfortunately, there are fundamental problems in implementing both kinds of advice. Some of the best givers of this advice implicitly assume that if leaders know *what* to do they will be able to do it. Others assume that their advice will be implemented successfully if certain specified organizational structures or practices are created. Such assumptions are not valid, based on our (cumulative) 50 years of experience involving

several hundred consulting projects in many organizations from Fortune 100 companies to government organizations and smaller companies, plus 20 years of experience in management/executive positions in four companies. In preparing this paper, we reviewed and re-analyzed extensive data from these projects, especially comprising audio tapes and detailed notes of key verbatim statements made by participants during meetings and confidential interviews.

Having the right information is necessary, but not sufficient for leaders to implement the advice. For example, we studied over 300 individuals in one of our client organizations who participated in an intensive five-day off-site leadership training program given by a highly respected consulting firm. During the five days they were introduced to a set of leadership and communication skills which they were expected to use back at the office. In their self-report data, gathered in the follow-up study several months later, over 75 percent of these individuals reported that they had used the new skills regularly and successfully back at the office. However, audiotapes of their attempts indicated that fewer than one in a hundred implemented any of the new skills back at the office. All individuals who listened to their own tapes agreed that they had failed to do what they thought they had done. We have replicated this study five times over an eight-year period and the findings have been similar every time: very few individuals who learn new information, and even believe they are using this information in their actions, are able to produce new behaviors consonant with the new information. There is a vast gap between "knowing" what to do and producing the corresponding behavior.

Similarly, having the right structure may be necessary, but it is certainly not sufficient to produce desired improvements. We have extensive data from 42 major organization development projects in which structural change was intended to bring about improvements such as faster adaptation to change, improved synergy among functional groups operating with different and conflicting architectures, and improved coordination. The data include detailed, verbatim dialogue from key meetings and from private, confidential interviews with individuals across functional areas, spanning three levels of hierarchy. The senior executive in 24 of these projects reported satisfaction with the impact the reorganization appeared to be having. Yet, only four of these executives reported satisfaction with the bottom-line results. We analyzed transcripts of key meetings and interviewed individuals privately and confidentially in all 42 cases. All four organizations that produced satisfactory results also discussed in timely and productive ways all of the issues individuals identified privately as most important to manage better. In all the other 38 projects, even those in which the senior executive reported that a satisfactory difference was brought about from the reorganization, at least one of the issues most important to manage well remained undiscussed in the appropriate organizational group.

Both of these consulting assumptions - that information or a new structure is sufficient to bring about desired change - are based on a commonly shared third assumption. Most of our advice-givers, behavioral and structural, tacitly assume that human beings have the innate capabilities necessary to implement their advice. Regrettably, this is not the case. Individuals do not have an innate capability to build trust, empower people, be tough and participatory, face reality, and care for others, for example. In fact the opposite is true: the innate capabilities and internal "programming" of individuals prevent them from following such advice successfully. Further, the absence of the capabilities

necessary to follow the behavioral advice undermines the power of the right organizational structure to produce the desired performance improvements such as ensuring timely adaptation to change, timely innovation, synergistic integration of units with competing operating requirements, and successful use of virtual organizations.

The result is a dilemma for leaders. They find the advice valid. The behavioral advice expresses their deepest, most cherished social values. The structural advice expresses their accepted understanding of the relationship between organizations and their environments, as well as principles of good organization design. The people offering this advice, both behavioral and structural, assume that leaders can implement it if they choose to. However, leaders fail to implement the advice successfully, even though they intend to. This creates experiences of failure, shame, embarrassment, and guilt. Then they try to distance themselves from these feelings.

Following the good advice available is a very big deal. Learning to do so has a profound positive impact on organizations. We know that. Knowledge of what to do is necessary, but not sufficient. Structure may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. So what else is necessary and sufficient to implement the very good advice available, advice that appears essential to optimal leadership and organizational performance? To provide an answer, the next three sections discuss problems and barriers to implementing good advice. Then the final three sections offer a solution, including a process for the personal learning necessary.

Why Can't We Implement Good Advice?

Some mainstream advice offers us important clues about the barriers to implementing good advice. In a recent book, Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) focused on the gap between what managers know and what they do, a phenomenon they call the "knowing-doing gap." They argued that the sources of and solutions to this gap are largely related to organizational practices, with fear playing a prominent part in producing the gap. Bandura (1997) works with a similar observation ("knowing managerial rules does not ensure optimal implementation of them") and has continued to develop his social cognitive learning theory, including an approach for learning to manage fear more productively through understanding the importance of self-efficacy. He has found that learning to manage fear more productively leverages performance significantly. Goleman's (1995) emotional competence framework identifies a set of intrapersonal and interpersonal skills (e.g., self-awareness and honest self-assessment, self-regulation, and empathy) that have a greater impact on achievement than IQ (or knowledge, *per se*).

Chris Argyris, both alone (e.g., 1976, 1990, 1999, 2000) and with the late Donald Schön (e.g., 1978, 1996) has been writing for the last 25 years about his research that identifies ubiquitous, systematic variance between what people say about their actions and how they act. Argyris and Schön (1996) found that individuals are always the agent of organizational action. Bandura (1997) also maintains that organizations are changed by the behavior of individuals. To understand the gap between good advice and execution, or the doing-knowing gap, we must understand what governs and influences individual action.

Argyris and Schön (e.g., 1978, 1996) described each of us as governed by two basic theories-of-action: our *espoused theory*, which governs the way we talk about our

thoughts, feelings and actions, and our *theory-in-use*, which determines what we actually think, feel, say, and do. These two theories are usually inconsistent and often contradictory within each individual. Recently Argyris (2000) described it this way:

There are inconsistencies between ideas about action and action itself. When we are producing action we are unaware of our gaps. But, when others are producing action, we are aware of their gaps, and we are aware that they are unaware. We remain unaware of the gaps between our ideas and action because we all suffer patterned blindness when we act. (p.4)

To help us become more aware of our actions, Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) developed a predictive model of human behavior that not only explains the doing-knowing gap, but also predicts the organizational practice traps and organizational level behaviors reported by Pfeffer and Sutton (2000), plus explains why good leaders cannot implement good advice. We believe, as does Bandura (1997), that all useful learning theories must have both predictive models of behavior and prescriptive models of how to learn. These models must describe necessary action at the level of interpersonal and intrapersonal talk. Argyris and Schön's theory does all this.

They found that all adults are driven by a common theory-in-use that is characterized by the following governing values or characteristics: (a) strive to control things unilaterally, at the exclusion of others' rightful control, (b) sell our point of view to others, discounting others' points of view, (c) discount and distort information that increases our emotional discomfort and challenges our own point of view, and (d) suppress our negative feelings and emotional discomfort, trying to hide negative and discomforting emotions even from ourselves (see, e.g., Festinger, 1957). Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) have labeled this description of our commonly held theory-in-use, "Model I." Goleman (1995) might call this self-incompetence.

A primary objective of our traditional (Model I) way of being in the world is to minimize emotional discomfort, even at the price of individual and organizational success. Problems are understood by assessing blame. Our usual ways of exercising leadership are to try to control people, decisions, events and processes unilaterally, to the exclusion of others' rightful influence and participation. When operating in Model I, our interpersonal and intrapersonal dialogues conflict and contradict each other. We tend to discount and mask these conflicts and contradictions, even though they increase internal anxiety - a normal form of increased emotional discomfort. When in disagreement with others, we assume that we know better, that we are right and others are wrong. We discount facts and the opinions and interests of others when they conflict with our own. We hide all of this from ourselves and, we hope, others. Model I breeds interpersonal conflict, internal competition, and arrogance. Over time, Model I undermines communication, cooperation, coordination, and morale.

Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) discovered that Model I is ubiquitous; it is found everywhere. It is the Model I interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics that prohibit us from using good advice and that explain the doing-knowing gap. Consider the following example.

A division president in a Fortune 100 company, which places a high value on democratic participation, faced a strategic dilemma. His division was number

one in its market niche. They had been losing market share to company number two for ten quarters. Number two was offering new product functionality that number one did not have yet. Number one had similar functionality under development, but the development project schedule was slipping. They could purchase outside enough functionality to stem the loss of market share. However, to fund the outside purchase would require, by corporate mandate, reducing funding of internal development of that functionality. To complicate matters, a corporate strategic task force just predicted that the division's primary product would be a commodity within three years. The task force believed that the company that controls the functionality in question would be the market leader.

The division president (DP) believed that if his division lost more market share now, he would be replaced. He was caught in a web of dilemmas. To shore up near-term market share required sacrificing the future. To give up near-term market share to invest in the future would cost him his job. The DP also believed that the future of the whole company required development of the functionality in question. If he was right and he chose to sacrifice the future, he believed his stock options would be worthless

DP hoped to be promoted and well into his next assignment before the division's main product became a commodity. DP considered raising his dilemmas with his boss, or in the Policy Meeting with several division presidents. He decided not to raise his dilemmas. He said, "if I do that everyone will think that I am just trying to side-step responsibility for not meeting my numbers. I would lose all credibility with those who have the power to promote me. People also might get very upset with me. These issues are very uncomfortable to deal with."

Instead, he formed a team of his most valued subordinates. He assigned one of them to coordinate and told them to come back to him with a recommendation to resolve this strategic dilemma. Privately, he voiced his doubts about the ability of the team to come up with an acceptable solution. He thought that the disagreements within the team would keep them from arriving at a creative consensus. He believed the team would not manage their conflicts creatively and would produce nothing of value.

In talking with him, after he had taken the actions just outlined (with facilitation by a well-known consulting firm), one of us (C) said that this course of action sounded like a prescription for failure. He agreed (note that his knowledge and actions were not consistent). C suggested that competent leadership was necessary to help the team manage its conflicts creatively. C said he thought DP should lead the team and put all the relevant disagreements on the table. DP said that if he led the team it would violate the company policy of democratic participation, and his presence would inhibit other members of the team from speaking their minds and being open. C asked him how he knew. He could not say, he was just sure B and he was quite certain he was right. His leading would cause another problem, as well. If he led the team, and the decision was wrong, he would be held responsible for making the wrong decision. However, if his team made the decision, without his participation, and it was wrong, he would not be held responsible. He cited several examples of division presidents leading

a task force that made a wrong decision and were not promoted. He cited many individuals who had been promoted, after following bad advice from leaderless, subordinate teams.

C said that it would be useful to raise his concerns with the team. DP said he could not do that, because that would upset members of the group and increase the risks he was concerned about. Again, he was sure he was right, even though he had not examined his conclusion critically and could supply no information to support it.

This example is typical of many others we have seen over the years. DP was in a tough situation. Every solution and every move he considered offered another problem as bad or worse than the original one he faced. Thinking about it caused him unacceptable emotional pain. His instinct was to keep his dilemmas secret, even though he acknowledged that the peers and superiors with whom he might discuss his dilemmas shared these dilemmas. Despite this acknowledgment he assumed that his peers and superiors would look down on him and be upset with him if he raised his dilemmas. He had not given much thought to this belief, but he believed it strongly and appeared unwilling to question it. He abdicated responsibility for resolving his dilemma. He delegated responsibility to a group consisting of his direct reports. He did this even though he had little confidence they would succeed. He withheld his concerns about the group because he believed that would aggravate the conflicts they must manage creatively. He believed his direct leadership would reduce the honesty and openness his subordinates would bring to their task, and he was concerned about being blamed for a failure. Even though he was questioned about his beliefs, he was unwilling to reconsider them. These are common and normal responses to this kind of situation, in which a leader's traditional internal programming prevents her/him from resolving his/her dilemmas and being effective.

DP acted in a traditional Model I mode. Reality was avoided. No one demonstrated openness and honesty. Conflict was avoided rather than managed creatively. He certainly was not tough and participatory. No one felt empowered. Little care or concern was shown for others. No trust was built. This took place in a corporation that had been retaining one of the best-known structural advice-givers for a decade. The decisions and processes DP used were developed and implemented with facilitation by professionals from this advice-giver's consulting firm.

This example may seem too blatant and incompetent to be generalizable. This is a typical reaction; however, both our research and consulting experience indicates that this example is the norm, not an exception. We have presented various similar case examples of leaders who were performing ineffectively, because of the constraints of Model I programming, in over 600 seminars and training programs during the past 20 years. Many of these seminar participants dismissed as too extreme our description of Model I programming as well as the real-life cases we presented, which were all similar to the one described above. Many acknowledged these cases and programming existed, but denied their ubiquity. Many said variations on the following, "I don't have such pervasive and inflexible programming. I would not do that in a similar situation." Such reactions are a common and predictable response because the pervasive Model I programming that causes this type of behavior also prevents the individual from

recognizing it.

Next, seminar participants were presented with a paradox that helped them recognize their actual behavior. During each seminar, after we presented a model of traditional Model I programming plus an example case, we asked participants to critique the case and offer advice to the primary player in the case, DP in the preceding case. Almost all of the advice espoused by the participants was good. Then we asked for volunteers to role-play their advice (solutions to the case). With no exceptions, their actual behavior failed to follow their own critique and advice about the case and, instead, their behavior was consistent with Model I. In every seminar we next gave participants the information they needed to role-play a successful solution. We modeled implementation of a successful solution and, still, far fewer than one percent of the participants (there have been over 5,000 participants from Fortune 500 companies) were able to immediately change their behavior from that characteristic of Model I. Further, we have analyzed over a thousand critical events involving executives from our consulting projects and have yet to find anyone whose actual (not espoused) behavior before intervention did not follow Model I programming. We have surveyed and analyzed over two hundred organizations in Fortune 1000 companies and have yet to find an organization that did not conform to Model I programming before intervention. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Argyris and his colleagues (1985, 1996, 1999, 2000), from their observations in working with thousands of executives. They have found that *all* leaders and *all* organizations operate from a Model I framework, prior to an intervention to change this. Further, they have found that leaders are unable to produce behavior that deviates from this programming without an intervention, even after having information and examples of different behavior.

Model I Leadership

Individuals, including leaders, are constrained by the pervasive internal Model I programming we all inherit. Developing an alternative to Model I is necessary to enable ourselves to implement the good advice available. However, this is a difficult challenge.

Each of us is programmed in ways that make us somewhat unique, and also in ways that make us alike. It is the ways in which we are all alike, our common programming, that make us innately incapable of implementing the best advice being offered to us. Based on our experiences in and research on several hundred consulting projects, our version of Argyris and Schön's Model I is summarized in Table 2 and described below.

The following five values (i.e., fundamental principles that are valued by individuals and underlie their actions) seem to be common to all leaders' internal programming. One common value is *unilateral control*. We exercise power in ways that exclude others from exercising power appropriately. Our efforts to control decisions, tasks, and resources exclude others from what they consider their rights and needs to exercise control, as well. As consultants, we have observed hundreds of executives say they are delegating full authority to a subordinate and then go out and make unilateral decisions that undermine the subordinate's authority. However, among humans' most cherished values are the importance of individual freedoms and the right to self-determination. Unilateral control violates both of these cherished values. These competing values create a dilemma. When we exercise power, we violate our human values and good

advice; however, when we avoid exercising power, we violate our leadership responsibilities. Leaders face this dilemma constantly.

Table 2. The Rossmore & Mitchell Version of Model I (Traditional Leadership)

<p>Governing Values</p>	<p>Exercise control unilaterally over goals, decisions, tasks, resources, processes, and projects, as well as others' actions, even thoughts and feelings Avoid emotional discomfort and pain Be rational Promote my interests Be "right" and avoid being "wrong"</p>
<p>Action Strategies</p>	<p>Exercise control in ways that exclude others from control Try to convince others that I am "right" and they are wrong Control information and communications to benefit my own interests Pursue my interests, even when at the expense of the group's interests</p>
<p>Tactics</p>	<p>Confuse facts and opinions in taking in, processing, and communicating information Discount facts and opinions that are upsetting Withhold information that might weaken my positions Search for and exploit weaknesses in others' points of view Bypass differences and disagreements unless there is an advantage to me Avoid or delay dealing with difficult issues Blame others, not myself Unilaterally "protect" others from being hurt by withholding information, censoring actions, avoiding public discussions Modify my actions to avoid experiencing emotional discomfort, and rationalize the modifications Do not question my own thinking or decisions Rationalize and camouflage my efforts to control and bypass, and pursue self-interests</p>
<p>Consequences for Leaders</p>	<p>We remain unaware of the differences between our professed intentions and our actions (between our "talk" and our "walk") Our maps and perceptions of events and situations are faulty We avoid issues, decisions, and actions Our efforts to control cause resentment Some problems and conflicts remain unsolved Our learning produces marginal improvements at best</p>

A second characteristic value underlying all our internal programs is a strong, deep and instinctual *desire to avoid emotional discomfort*. We go to great lengths to avoid

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emotional pain. We avoid discussion of painful issues, even when they are important. Essentially all of the thousands of executives we have trained said, roughly, "Oh, I can't say that," when "that" was an important statement about the issue the executive identified as most important to manage better. When asked what would happen if they said, "that," some clients said something such as, "Oh, if I did that everyone would get

too upset." Others said, "no one says that in this kind of meeting; it is unheard of." Still others said, "he/she would get angry and I would never get the cooperation and effort I need."

We avoid making some decisions, in order to avoid too much more emotional discomfort. Many of us try to avoid hurting the feelings of others, as well. We distort and discount information that would be painful to process. This creates another kind of painful dilemma. To face reality when dealing with difficult issues and decisions requires processing information that increases emotional discomfort and also involves discussions that do the same. The only way to avoid increased discomfort at times is to avoid reality and avoid taking necessary action. Avoidance involves distancing ourselves from our own emotions. The problem with this is that when we distance ourselves from our emotions, we also distance ourselves from the thoughts and actions that correspond to those emotions. In other words, we make ourselves blind to ourselves.

When we distance ourselves from our emotions we are unaware of what we do, the impacts we have on others, what we think and what we feel. In addition, we are unaware that we are unaware.

A third shared value of our Model I internal programming is the *desire to act and appear rational*, both to others and ourselves. Hundreds of executives have told us that appearing rational was essential to their credibility. They also said that appearing irrational would undermine their influence. Almost all believed that expressing anger, fear, or sadness would undermine their credibility. They acknowledged that they systematically suppress their emotions to hide them from others.

One of our basic strategies for avoiding emotional discomfort is to distance ourselves from our own emotions. By distancing ourselves from our own emotions, we distance ourselves from awareness of the programming that drives, determines, and constrains our rationality. We frequently observe executives avoid and bypass discussion of the issues they have identified as most important to discuss. When confronted, all voice concern that raising the issue would provoke an emotionality that would undermine rationality and reflect badly on them.

A fourth underlying value is that we *pursue and promote our own interests*, often at the expense of the interests of our groups and organizations. We control information to our personal benefit. We manipulate events to benefit our interests. Of course we try as best we can to hide these actions. This is the paradoxical essence of unilateral control. Hundreds of executives, many with very high employee satisfaction scores, acknowledged to us that they strive to control things unilaterally so they can get exactly what they want. However, all acknowledged wanting improved communication, cooperation, and coordination within their organizations - which, paradoxically, are undermined by unilateral control.

The last shared value to consider at this point is the way individuals *frame situations in terms of being "right" rather than "wrong"* - of winning, not losing. Either we are born with, or are infected early with, a strong desire to win and not lose. Over 90% of the 5,000 executives we have trained have acknowledged that winning and avoiding losing were primary drivers in the critical situations they have discussed during training. Win-lose dynamics undermine teamwork and morale. Over 90% of those executives who acknowledged win-lose dynamics said that they felt it was shameful to be caught imposing win-lose dynamics in a situation in which collaboration was desired. However, even in such situations we cannot help ourselves. We continue to see situations and events in terms of winning and losing. Since the result is shameful, we hide, from others we think, and from ourselves as well. Before we can replace our win-lose frame with something else, we must become aware of the frame we are using in the moment, and this is often painful to do.

Over the last 30 years, we have not yet found a leader who does not act, without intensive training and work, with Model I programming based on the five common values just described. This Model I traditional leadership has characteristics summarized in Table 2. The five governing values provide the primary foundations for most traditional leadership decisions and actions, although they are usually tacit and not considered consciously and explicitly by leaders. When confronted, most leaders reject these governing values (in Table 2) and espouse different, more socially desirable ones; however, their actions are consistent with the five Model I governing values. Further, their action strategies and tactics (observed actions) are typical of those summarized in the second and third sections of Table 2. The double-bind for leaders is that their internal programming not only causes them to act as illustrated in Table 2, but also keeps them from recognizing, examining or questioning their own thinking. This unawareness seals them off from the possibility of changing even their action strategies, much less their underlying governing values. Further, leaders are usually unaware of their unawareness.

How Model I Leadership Keeps Us from Implementing Good Advice

Let's consider some of the advice examples in Table 1 in the context of traditional Model I leadership, as outlined in Table 2.

1. Build trust and credibility

We want to be able to trust each other in various ways, including that others: (a) will give us reliable and relevant information; (b) will do what they say they will, when they say they will do it; (c) will have good will toward us; (d) will not hurt us; (e) will perform well; (f) will give us good advice; (g) will tell us when they think we are wrong or not performing well enough.

However, traditional leadership programming involves confusing facts and opinions, discounting contrary and discomfoting facts and opinions, withholding information, and bypassing differences. For example, at a high-tech start-up company, five of the six senior executives predicted sales of no more than \$16 million in the first year after they launched their first product. The senior marketing executive presented a forecast of \$30 million. Privately, the other five members of the team voiced strong disagreement with the marketing executive's forecast, but, publicly, all went along with this projection.

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The company hired staff and incurred fixed overhead costs based on the higher number. This precipitated a financial crisis six months later, when the actual sales were far below the projection. When questioned privately about bypassing their disagreement, the acquiescing executives said they thought expressing disagreement would harm trust in the team, and they believed that without trust and teamwork the company could not succeed.

When we exhibit these typical Model I behaviors we are neither trustworthy nor credible. In many cases, we are unaware of doing these things, yet others are aware. We are unaware of much of what we do that undermines the trust others have in us. Discussion of mistrust and the things that cause mistrust are avoided.

2. Empower everyone

Empowering usually means moving decision making downward in an organization. We think it should be viewed as optimizing individuals' appropriate influence over events that impact them while optimizing each person and group's discretionary authority, without harming the coordination necessary to succeed. Optimizing each person and group's influence requires that each person and group must also be appropriately "influence-able." After all it is not possible for one person to have influence if the other person is not influenceable. However, traditional programming means that we are minimally influenceable in our efforts to control things unilaterally. We are programmed to exercise control in ways that exclude others from exercising control. We do this even when we agree that the other person should exercise the control that we are excluding them from exercising. For example, as frequently quoted at the mid-eighties Apple Corporation, "even if the vote were 14,000 to 1 (Steve Jobs'), it is still a tie."

3. Be tough and participatory

We believe that being tough means putting the hard issues on the table and facing them on time: questioning long-held strategic beliefs, articulating disagreements, describing conflicts, criticizing performance, articulating dilemmas. Being participatory means sharing one's own views, and one's own views of others' views, plus available facts and thinking on the tough issues. It also means encouraging others to do the same. However, Model I leadership involves habitually bypassing tough issues. We systematically withhold some of our views, facts and thinking from others at the same time we demonstrate disinterest and disregard for others' views, facts, and thinking.

4. Face reality and be adaptive

We are programmed to avoid reality when facing it is painful. We confuse facts and opinions. We discount painful facts and opinions. We avoid discussion of painful issues. We sustain our own unawareness that we are doing these things in order to avoid the pain of seeing what we are doing. And we remain puzzled about our inability to understand situations and events that are important to us. In the start-up example given under item one, the senior executives were unaware that they had withheld their objections and concerns in the appropriate executive forums, even though they were then able to give their reasoning behind the avoidance, after the fact, once they discovered what they had done.

5. Be open and honest

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We are programmed to withhold information that undermines our own position, or supports opposing positions, in order to win and avoid losing. We are aware that others do this, which raises our mistrust of them (and they are aware that we are doing this, as well). We remain unaware that we do this. Each person withholds and is unaware. Each person is aware that others have withheld, and each person withholds their knowledge of the withholding by others.

6. Exhibit care and concern for others

To exhibit care for others requires empathy. Empathy requires that we experience directly and articulate to others our immediate emotions about their suffering and injustice. Yet, Model I programming causes us to distance ourselves from our own emotions, in our effort to avoid emotional discomfort. Empathy is not possible when we are distant from our own emotions. We remain unaware of the extent to which we distance ourselves from our own emotions. Without empathy, an acceptable understanding of another's point of view is not possible.

7. Manage conflict creatively

Creative conflict management requires the ability to discover, articulate, and resolve dilemmas; sufficient trust and a strong common purpose; and the willingness to place the organization's interests above those of individuals and groups. None of these abilities and attitudes are innate. We tend to avoid conflict situations because of our need to avoid emotional discomfort. When we do deal with conflict, we tend to be aggressive and unilateral, rather than collaborative. Without empathy, acceptable understanding of others' points of view is not possible. Without such an understanding, recognition and appreciation of dilemmas is not possible. When we are disconnected from our feelings, we systematically place our own interests above those of the group. We remain unaware that we have done that, until pointed out by others.

8. Create a vision and translate it into reality

Visions that are created through processes that follow the best behavioral advice still are seldom implemented successfully. Conflicts are avoided, consensus is emphasized. Given the complexities of our organizations, it is not possible to design a competent vision that does not cause suffering to some and injustice to others. When Model I drives the vision design, conflicts are avoided, consensus is emphasized. To avoid conflict and achieve consensus, reality is avoided. The language of such visions suffers from an absence of specificity, so that everyone leaves with their private, equally valid interpretation of the vision. A pseudo-agreement is created that can not be implemented, because unresolved issues or disagreements in the vision will show up as errors in implementation.

9. Stress time-based competition; 10. Align all aspects of the organization with customer needs and expectations; 11. Increase use of virtual organizations; 12. Move toward distributed organizations and flatter structures; 13. Decentralize decision making

These largely structural changes require learning, communication, and coordination capabilities found in few organizations. They require competent, tough, compassionate leadership to implement major changes in the face of opposition within the organization. All of these are rare to find.

For example, a technology company decided it must reduce the time it took to bring new products to market. A corporate VP was assigned responsibility for improving time to market across the enterprise. Even though he was assigned the responsibility, he was delegated no authority over any of the product or development managers who would have to implement whatever new actions he recommended. After nine months of study and preparation, the new campaign to improve time to market was launched with talks and video presentations by the CEO and other company luminaries. Each functional organization was to be measured on the plans it developed to implement the new program, which were to include use of self-directed teams. After the first presentation, the general attitude in the company about the program went from hopeful ("I sure hope this works, because we need to improve") to cynical ("another wasted effort that sucks up resources and will be a bad joke a year from now"). All functional groups adopted a strategy of optimizing their appearance of compliance using the fewest resources possible.

Six months after launch of the program, it was in trouble. Most people believed the program failed to address the root problems in improving time to market, which were centered around poor decision making. The self-directed teams responsible for making strategic decisions were seen as a serious problem. Many decisions were either late or were not stable and were revisited, over and over again. There was high mistrust and poor cooperation and communication between marketing and engineering. Further, it was unclear how decisions would be made when the two departments disagreed. The ineffectiveness of the self-directed decision making teams and the poor cooperation and communication between marketing and engineering were undiscussible issues.

14. Create information-rich organizations with shared information widely available
This advice is not implementable because Model I drives us to confuse facts and opinions, discount relevant facts and opinions, and withhold relevant information. Implementing this advice requires information that contains clearly separated and verified facts and opinions, shared data ownership, outstanding information systems, mutual accommodation of work being done in various places, strong common purpose, and high morale. These require shared control and leaders who avoid placing their own interests above those of the organization. However, traditional Model I programming produces all kinds of information distortions, withholding of information, provincialism, and sub-optimization by work groups trying to pursue self-interests.

What Is Needed to Use the Advice?

Most of the time, leaders remain unaware of the values and internal programming that govern their actions, and they remain unaware of the implications of the actions they take. Their actions undermine learning, leading, and performance. Unless leaders can replace Model I programming with something better, they cannot implement the best advice available. Here's our advice on a better alternative to traditional Model I leadership programming.

Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) have proposed an alternative to Model I, which they call Model II. Learning and teaching Model II has led us to conclude that Model II needs to begin with a commitment to accept responsibility for our own actions and the impacts on

others and events, even when this results in escalating our emotional discomfort. A primary objective for leaders is to learn to be simultaneously more effective and more humane, and to learn how to learn. Model II requires that we learn to sustain productive activity of various kinds in the face of escalating emotional discomfort. Without this skill we take our eye off the ball when it hurts us.

Some basic components of Model II are: (a) we must strive to develop a deep appreciation for, and understanding of, others' points of view; (b) we must account for all relevant facts and opinions, when understanding and explaining events; (c) we must develop a deep commitment to raise risky and threatening issues, face to face, despite

the anticipation of, and in the face of, escalating emotional discomfort; and (d) we must strive to exercise control in ways that enables others to exercise their rightful influence as well.

Model II is very difficult to master, especially for use under high stress conditions, and mastery requires coaching and facilitation by individuals who have already mastered it. Mastery also requires rigorous, regular self-reflection that causes painful, intermittent increases in emotional discomfort. Few are willing to suffer the painful increases in emotional discomfort, unless highly motivated to bring about change.

Influenced by Argyris and Schön, our own personal experience, and our research on our consulting projects and training efforts, we have identified a set of five characteristics that individuals, in most cases, develop as they learn Model II: intellect, temperament, compassion, relatedness, and moral courage. We have found that explicit attention to and development of these characteristics facilitate the learning of Model II, and result in developing different internal programming, based on these five governing values (i.e., fundamental characteristics that can be valued by leaders and thereby become the foundation for their actions). These governing values are summarized in Table 3 and discussed in this section.

The middle column of Table 3 summarizes some of the major action strategies and actions that a leader would use when operating from the five governing values listed in the left column. Each of the values and corresponding actions are discussed below.

Intellect

The essence of intellect, in the present context, is separating facts from opinions, inferences, and attributions and then verifying relevant items. In the start-up example discussed earlier, the senior marketing executive predicted almost twice the revenue as the rest of team predicted. Later, he acknowledged that his figure of \$30 million in sales was what he was wishing for, rather than an honest forecast. He also acknowledged that he had discounted the facts and opinions presented by his teammates. Intellect refers to what is essential for leaders to make sense of situations, decide what to do, and give the directions and support necessary to implement the decision. Intellect allows leaders to do these things, with an ability to scent out and discern the truth, even when cloudy and uncertain or producing emotional discomfort.

Temperament

Once we have identified and sorted our facts and opinions, we must weave them together in ways that account for all relevant facts and opinions as we make sense of the situation and design and implement actions to influence future events successfully (i.e., essentially build a working theory). To use intellect in competent sense making, decision making, and action requires a special type of temperament. We advocate the attributes Clausewitz (1976) describes as the essence of temperament: inner clarity, presence of mind, energy, endurance, determination, stability, emotional balance, strength of character, unselfishness, self-control, and moral courage (which is listed separately as one of the characteristics). At the onset of WWI, Pierre duPont was unique among arms manufacturers in the business model he applied to the war business. During the Spanish War, arms manufacturers had assumed a long war and suffered significant losses when the war ended in a year. DuPont accepted no WWI government business that he was doubtful would produce an acceptable return on the investment within one year. By the second year of the war, DuPont was exceptionally profitable while all other arms manufacturers were in financial trouble. The essence of this special kind of temperament involves considering all relevant facts and opinions effectively, even under very difficult conditions.

Compassion

We demonstrate compassion by taking appropriate action with all necessary effort and resources while simultaneously acknowledging pain and injustice with empathy. Empathy is the ability to have a direct emotional experience of the other person's emotional experience. After every battle, Caesar would walk over the battlefield wailing the loss of each of his soldiers. His men loved him for it. His wailing allowed each soldier to hear his own heart sob. Thus Caesar, by acknowledging pain with sadness and respect, helped his men transform the devastation of their grief into love. Such behavior almost always enhances morale, i.e., the sense of purpose, loyalty, commitment, and energy C the very spirit of an organization.

Relatedness

Although self-interests are inevitable and pervasive, Wilfrid Bion (1959) articulated "relatedness" as demonstrated by not placing our own interests above those of the group, even when under stress. The British Army used relatedness as the primary criterion for qualifying officers candidates during the Second World War, with great success. Every time we have seen a leader demonstrate relatedness, we also found an organization with high morale. One of our clients, the CEO of a promising start-up company, recently gave up his position as CEO to bring into the company his top choice for an individual with vitally needed marketing expertise (and who would not come without having the CEO position). Our client experienced a profound sense of loss giving up his position and yet he felt good and unambivalent about his decision to relinquish his CEO position.

We can broaden this notion of relatedness by using Culbert and McDonough's (1985) concept of "alignment," which represents the distinctive way each individual aligns his/her individual self-interests with the interests of the organization in which s/he works. A leader with an effective alignment finds ways to represent important self-interests while also taking care of organizational interests and, therefore, has

relatively few situations in which her/his individual interests are in serious conflict with the interests of the group or organization.

Table 3. The Rossmore & Mitchell Version of Model II Leadership

Governing Values	Values in Action	Impact and Comments
Intellect	Gather relevant facts and opinions Separate facts and opinions Verify facts and opinions Articulate disagreements, differences in thinking and facts, and dilemmas that must be resolved Model and promote dialogue that balances advocacy of one's own positions (while encouraging others to query and challenge those positions) with deep inquiry about and interest in the positions of others	More relevant facts and opinions increase the likelihood that important gaps in understanding will be filled More relevant facts and opinions reduce the risk of building faulty interpretations and causal-predictive models Productive dialogue is essential to action consonant with the governing values
Temperament	Account for all relevant facts and opinions when interpreting actions and statements, and when building causal-predictive models Verify interpretations and models Search for ways to resolve dilemmas and disagreements (jointly with others)	Failure to verify and account for uncomfortable facts and opinions is a common strategic mistake Failure to verify interpretations and models is also a common strategic error Useful causal-predictive models require sufficient verification and accounting for all relevant facts and opinions
Compassion	Respond with empathy to observed and reported pain and injustice: - by expressing one's own appropriate thoughts & associated emotions - by taking necessary action competently	Rational thought, and competent, appropriate action, often triggers increased emotional pain Compassion mitigates some of the difficulty of facing increased emotional pain and offers the most profound encouragement available to do so
Relatedness	Avoid placing self-interests above group interests, even under extreme stress and pain Create conditions in which each individual and group can exercise appropriate power and influence while simultaneously producing needed communication, cooperation, and coordination	When leaders place their own interests above those of the group, others are likely to do the same When the prevailing norm subordinates group interests to individual interests, either tyranny or anarchy follow, even if camouflaged The most profound encouragement leaders can offer others to place the group first is to do so themselves Our human values require that each individual and group be afforded

		appropriate influence and power; realizing these human values boosts morale significantly
Moral Courage	Accept responsibility, before our own conscience and interested others, for integrating our leadership and human values and acting on them simultaneously and successfully Execute responsibilities even when painful	Moral courage is needed to think rationally, and act appropriately and competently, while suffering significant emotional pain When moral courage is absent, leaders do not have the motivation or capacity to face their emotional pain Subordinates are much more likely to act with moral courage if their leaders do

Moral Courage

We demonstrate moral courage by accepting responsibility for our actions and the consequences of our actions both internally, before our own conscience, and externally, before those touched by our leadership. At the end of the third and last day of the Battle of Gettysburg, after Pickett's Division had been destroyed during their charge, Robert E. Lee stepped out from cover to greet the few survivors saying, "It is all my fault. It is all my fault." Then he wrote President Davis that he was to blame and he offered his resignation. We believe that moral courage in our modern corporate world includes the following: (a) taking timely, appropriate, and effective action required by our position; (b) ensuring timely, productive discussion of all relevant issues; and (c) recognizing and accepting the consequences of all our actions. When we lack moral courage, we shy away from tough decisions and issues, even though they are our responsibility. Not until we accept responsibility for living according to our leadership and human values will we find the strength and will to face our actions, thoughts, and emotions. Not until we accept responsibility for our leadership and human values will we find the energy and determination to act while anticipating and experiencing unacceptable emotional discomfort. We believe the essence of moral courage is this: do the right thing, according to your own intellect and conscience, despite any and all pain.

The middle and right columns of Table 3 summarize and comment on some of the actions and impacts of Model II leadership, with its internal programming based on the five governing values just discussed. We believe that moral courage is required to account for opinions and facts that trigger too much emotional discomfort when they are considered. Intellect is needed to ensure sufficient relevance, specificity, and verifiability of available information. Empathy is required to accurately anticipate what others will do. Based on our specific analysis of thirty consulting projects we have done during the last ten years, the broader impact of Model II actions is that key leadership dilemmas are resolved successfully, with the result that important issues, problems, conflicts, decisions, and implementation actions are handled more effectively. Consequently, the performance and morale of both the leader and those affected by the leader are improved.

The Learning Process

How can leaders learn to change their internal programming to operate from a Model II framework, so they can use the good advice available?

First, it is necessary to begin with a commitment to accept responsibility for our own actions and the impacts on others and events, even when this results in escalating our emotional discomfort. Then, it is necessary to embark on an extensive action learning process to develop and internalize a new, Model II internal program, with characteristics described in the previous section. This process includes the three key elements in Bandura's (1997) learning process: modeling, extensive guided practice under simulated conditions, and facilitated application to real-life situations. In order to develop this new programming, individuals have to find ways to make their new programming operative in specific situations as they learn, despite the self-sealing features of their old programming. Individuals each have programming with many different components. As individuals are trying to develop new programming, their old, traditional programming remains. At any moment, within an individual, both old and new components are competing to determine how that individual will think, feel, and act in a particular situation. It is possible for a person to make a choice about the program that drives thinking, feeling, and action when he/she is aware of the programs that are vying within her/him and when the person has developed the skills to choose one program over another. However, to have this awareness and make choices requires being in close touch with emotions, even if those emotions cause pain. Traditional Model I programming tends to avoid pain and, thus, blocks individuals from learning.

The commitment and effort required to do this is a demanding challenge that requires embracing and applying the fundamental governing values in supervised training plus practice over many months. It requires skillful training and coaching plus a setting with colleagues who can and will provide good feedback and help in analyzing situations and practicing new, different behaviors. The learning process also places high demands on the skills, intensity, and focus of the coach.

An Example

Consider this example of a leader who persisted through the pain to begin learning. *An individual ("Paul") was promoted to President of the Corporate Research and Development Division (CRD) of a Fortune 500 company. He replaced a beloved president who had masked his own unilateral control by showing great interest in everyone's point of view - after he had made a decision, but before he announced it. Eight months after assuming the presidency, Paul was told by his boss that he was in trouble and needed consulting support.*

At Paul's request, we gathered data from confidential interviews in CRD. We found, and Paul and his entire senior team agreed, that the biggest issue facing CRD was widespread unhappiness and low morale throughout the organization. Most attributed this to Paul's poor "people managing." As one manager put it, "Paul needs to grow from being an excellent administrator to being a leader with vision, who trusts and delegates to his people." There was much mistrust and frustration. Other issues facing CRD paled by comparison. The good news was that people liked Paul and wanted to support him, but they felt that he was not letting them. They wanted him to trust them and enable them. They felt he could grow to become an effective leader. Typical comments were: "If he could be a people manager also, with his great technical knowledge, he will be a great manager." "If he would delegate, that would free up his time to become a bigger manager; he will do fine if he does that." "There is hope; he is trying to do a good job."

Paul's communication lapses were genuinely alarming. He was described as committing gaffes that would lead to his failure if not addressed. People said the following about Paul: "He misinterprets what people say to him." "He tells people what he thinks they want to hear." "He denies he said what others heard him say." "He puts people down." "He is unable to field objections productively." Paul received these findings with the rest of his senior team in an all-day meeting. He was puzzled by many of these attributions. With coaching, he asked questions such as, "please give me an example of my telling people what I think they want to hear?"

With coaching, responses such as the following were said to him, "before the last review we had with your boss, I thought you were clearly opposed to funding the X project, yet in the meeting you agreed with funding X, without even sharing your disagreements." He appeared to struggle mightily with his desire to explain away, disagree with, and argue about the findings, even though he acknowledged their validity. Half-way through the meeting, Paul was seen to be sweating visibly. He said that discussing this feedback without acting too defensively was the hardest thing he had ever tried to do. Despite the great effort required, he asked more questions such as the one above of his subordinates. This dialogue, in which difficult questions were asked and tough answers were offered, deepened his understanding of his negative impacts. As his understanding deepened, so did his emotional pain. The negative impacts were not what he intended. He had been unaware of both his actions and his impact. He was embarrassed and ashamed at what he had done. Paul reported going to bed at 8 p.m. that night because he was so exhausted, even though he seldom retired before midnight. He said he had been totally worn out by the feedback and discussion.

Paul and his entire senior team of direct reports met with a consultant for training and practice for two consecutive days a month for over a year. One day was devoted to training based on discussion of the two-column case format of Argyris and Schön (1996, 1999, 2000), in which one column contains the verbatim statements of the individuals involved and the other parallel column adds unexpressed thoughts and feelings of one or more individuals, particularly the person writing the case (Table 4 is an example segment from one of Paul's cases). Each individual wrote cases in advance (i.e., examples of interactions they wanted to understand better) that were analyzed and discussed in the group. After each case discussion, the discussion itself was analyzed and reflected on. An example of an observation that was explored follows: "I heard you say, 'Joe, don't you think you should give feedback as it occurs to you instead of waiting for the semi-annual performance review. This sounds rhetorical to me. It sounds as though you think X should do this, but instead of owning this as your idea you camouflaged it as a question. I think this discourages openness. What do you think?" Later in the discussion one of the team members asked Paul, "What do you think would happen if you gave this feedback as it occurred to you rather than waiting for the performance review? What do you think would happen if you said to him, you are not taking enough initiative for a principal scientist; until I see you design and implement your own project I will not promote you to principal scientist." Then, after a prediction of the response, "how do you know that would happen; what have you observed that leads to your prediction?"

Members of the team began asking of themselves and each other such questions, as well as the following: What were you thinking and feeling that led you to act the way you did,

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what could you have done differently, and what would you need to be thinking and feeling to do that? Considerable work took place outside the formal two day session each month, both in individual discussions between the consultant and individuals, and in regular work interactions among the team members.

Reflecting on his actions during the first eight months of his tenure, Paul realized and acknowledged that he been concerned and scared about replacing the much-beloved former president. He discovered that when he got scared in that way he lost interest in what others had to say. Instead, he became focused on telling and selling others his point of view. He said he felt as though success depended on how well he could control things by himself. He acknowledged that this approach to succeeding was paradoxical, causing him to fail.

During the first few monthly training sessions, Paul received feedback on instances in which he was observed distorting what others said, and selling rather than listening and inquiring. He took the tapes from the sessions and listened to them. He began to see what others had observed and described to him. At the next meeting he role-played new ways of acting and asked his subordinates what they thought.

After several months of focused effort by Paul and his subordinates, the latter grew increasingly impressed with Paul's effort. They knew how hard he was working, because they were working on themselves in the same ways and experienced the pain themselves. Trust increased. Communication improved dramatically. People one and two levels down were seen cooperating across functional boundaries in ways that had not been done previously.

As training and practice progressed, Paul began to catch himself just after he had done something that he was trying to change. He would say, "There I go again. Is that right - I just did it?" Then he began catching himself about to do one of his defensive routines. He would stop and say, "I am about to go into sell mode. Here is what I am thinking... what can I do instead?" Constantly, he acknowledged this was the hardest work he had ever done. Most of his team-mates agreed. Then he would say that he had no choice because he was committed to succeeding. At every training session he volunteered to discuss others' cases so he could practice and get feedback.

Morale and bottom-line performance of the entire Research and Development organization improved. Those one and two levels down reported noticing the differences in communication and cooperation at the top, as well as Paul's leadership improvements. They voiced appreciation of these changes.

Paul demonstrated moral courage in the way he continued to look at his behavior, its impact on others, and his thoughts and feelings connected to his actions. Paul did this despite a significant increase in his emotional discomfort. He owned responsibility for actions he felt ashamed of in front of his direct reports. By doing these things he earned increased respect and admiration from his direct reports. He improved his ability to separate fact from opinion, which allowed him to see more clearly what he did, rather than what he thought he did. He learned to verify both his facts and opinions. He learned to account for all observed factors when he tried to understand and explain what happened.

Having the initial insight was not sufficient for Paul to produce new behaviors even under low-stress conditions. Two days per month of intensive practice was not sufficient to learn new behavior that he could use under high stress conditions. Paul practiced and reflected regularly for over a year. He did it within the context of his team, which over the course of months developed the practice of giving each other feedback as it came up, instead of waiting for the next training session. The new skills and value that Paul and individuals on his team began mastering resulted in significant increases in trust and credibility. More people felt empowered. Both Paul and the team together learned to be tough and participatory, face reality and be adaptive, be open and honest, exhibit care and concern for others, and manage conflict creatively. Paul also created a vision which he and his team translated into reality.

Table 4. An Example Excerpt from a Two-Column Case

This is an excerpt of a case Paul wrote and worked on in a learning session with his senior team. A recent company reorganization had changed some of the functions of his division, necessitating that several scientists be transferred to suitable jobs in other divisions. Arranging for these transfers was not easy. Paul described an interaction with one of these scientists ("X"), who would not accept the fact that he needed to move, and he actually undermined some of the job interviews that were arranged for him. The meeting described below occurred a few days after an interview that X had with a manager (Y). Following the interview, Y called Paul to ask why X had bothered to interview for the job since he obviously had no interest in it.

Paul's unexpressed thoughts	Dialogue between Paul and X
<p>God knows I'm not looking forward to yet another meeting with X. I've got to help him understand that his bad attitude and lack of cooperation are killing his chances of obtaining good jobs for which he is well qualified.</p> <p>When X says systems, he means</p>	<p>Paul: How's it going, X? Any progress on the job front?</p> <p>X: Not many good jobs available.</p> <p>Paul: Well, how did the interview go with Y?</p> <p>X: Oh, that job was not for me. He needs a circuit designer, but I'm really an ABC systems guy now.</p> <p>Paul: Did you explore the opportunities for systems jobs with Y?</p> <p>X: Not really. Besides, I should stay right here in Division 2. We need my systems expertise.</p> <p>Paul: We don't have the charter for the electronics system work that you're talking about. Y has that responsibility in Division 3</p>

<p>electronics system work that now is done in other divisions.</p> <p>How can I get through to this guy?</p> <p>X is not connected to reality.</p> <p>I must have another meeting with X to make sure he approaches W with the right attitude. W will want a trial period - probably 6 months. If this doesn't work out, I may have no option but to initiate termination proceedings. It's a good thing that X has been on a development action plan.</p>	<p>and Z has that responsibility in Division 4. You should talk again with Y and Z about opportunities in their organizations.</p> <p>X: Y will just want me to do circuit design and I don't want to work for Z. Besides, we should do those interface designs here.</p> <p>Paul: Your opinion is fine, but we do not have the charter and I'm not going to try to acquire that responsibility. You need to face the facts and accept that you must move into a job that matches your skills....</p> <p>...X: You don't have any faith in me.</p> <p>Paul: I have plenty of faith in your ability to succeed in a job that matches your expertise. There is an ABC systems opening available in Division 5. I can get you an interview with manager W. It's important that you put your best foot forward in the interview. Show W that the job matches your skills and that you really want to do it.</p> <p>X: OK, I'll meet with W. He's a good guy.</p>
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Essential Steps in the Learning Process

The learning process Paul went through to develop new Model II programming is typical of that used by other clients successfully. This process involves analyzing and reflecting on specific situations in an individual's life, with others in a group and involving intensive, focused effort over many months. There are six key steps in the process. There also are three meta-processes embedded in the learning process - verification, reflection, and learning to be in touch with our emotions - which must be executed with competence to ensure the power and integrity of the learning process.

1. Discover our own behavior at the level of what we say, verbatim. Then discover the unintended negative impacts produced by our behavior in each specific situation that we examine. Paul discovered his unintended negative consequences when he received the feedback from the survey.
2. We must struggle successfully to accept responsibility for producing an unintended negative consequence and then for correcting it. If we do not accept responsibility, we have no motivation to observe it, think about it, or correct it. Doing so is hard and painful, requiring a deep commitment that comes only from accepting responsibility. One of the primary and difficult roles of the consultant-coach is to help the individual develop and maintain such a commitment. Paul had to fight valiantly his impulse to discount the data about his unintended negative impact. This took such a great effort he broke out in a sweat and was exhausted.
3. Identify, describe, and reproduce the behavior that resulted in the negative impact. Reproducing the behavior requires and enables us to see clearly what we did. Only after we reproduce the behavior do we know from the inside-out what we did. Further, until

we can produce a behavior at will, we cannot stop it at will. Paul asked others what they saw him do and then he verified his understanding by summarizing what he heard them describe. Then, he reproduced the behavior.

4. Find out whether or not others observed what we observed, i.e., verify that the behaviors we identify and reproduce are the same as those observed and identified by others. Once Paul summarized others' descriptions of his behavior he produced an example of the behavior and asked them if that was it.

5. Uncover and articulate the underlying assumptions, thoughts, and feelings that drove us to produce the behaviors that had unintended impacts. When we produce behavior that has unintended impacts, it is highly likely that we are unaware of the thoughts and feelings that drive our behavior. To stop producing the unintended behavior, we must become aware of these underlying thoughts and feelings. To discover our underlying thinking that drives us to produce unintended behavior, requires an A...if...then" process.

We can list all possible objectives the unintended behavior might reliably produce - if it were intended behavior. We can look within ourselves to see which feels most likely. To uncover assumptions, we can ask, "What might have happened if I had produced the behavior I intended; what would happen then; why would I want to avoid that?" Paul found himself saying, during a dialogue, that if he did not control decisions and processes he was sure he would fail. He discovered, to his surprise, that he had been scared about replacing his predecessor. Then he discovered, through inquiry with others in the group, that his coping strategy had been to take control; i.e., his theory of success, when afraid, was to seize and keep control as tightly as he could. He acknowledged that he had been unaware, at the time, that he was scared and that he was trying to seize and keep control.

6. Clarify the impact we want to have and design behavior that has an acceptable chance of producing the desired result. Once we have designed the behavior, we must learn to produce it. Once we have successfully produced it, we must evaluate if we did what we intended and if we got an acceptable result. Once we have produced a behavior that gets an acceptable result, we should practice it repetitively, even under increasing emotional stress and pain. Paul said he wanted to create a collaborative environment where all the members of his team contributed their points of view and had an appropriate impact on all decisions that affected them. Paul then wrote cases around specific situations, trying to design behavior that encouraged and promoted collaboration. During discussion of these cases, he furthered refined his designs and role-played them, and then asked for feedback on how well he implemented the design and whether his team would be satisfied with the new behavior. He listened to audiotapes of his attempts to implement the new behaviors. He practiced his new behaviors, both in the learning sessions and in regular work, and asked for feedback on how well he had implemented them.

To ensure the power and integrity of learning in this six-step process, it is vital throughout to verify and reflect on what we are doing. This includes monitoring our own behavior, to see if we are doing what we intend to do, and monitoring the results to see if we are having the impact we want to have. We must also verify our own monitoring, with the help of others. We can do this by sharing our hunches and conclusions with others and inviting them to raise doubts and disagreements with our observations. We must verify our newly uncovered thoughts and feelings by sharing with others who will

raise doubts and disagreements. For example, Paul did this when he interrupted himself, said that he thought he was doing his old behavior again, and checked this with those present by asking the group what they thought. It also is essential to learn both to recognize when one is out of touch with one's feelings and how to reconnect with these. We have experienced personally and with clients that being in touch with one's feelings-in-the-moment is absolutely essential to understanding one's actions, changing actions, and responding to others empathically.

To implement this learning process well requires a keen intellect, a special temperament, and significant moral courage, in addition to extensive support from colleagues and a coach. Intellect and temperament are essential to discovering unintentional negative consequences and behaviors. The ability to separate facts from opinions and to verify facts and opinions is necessary, but not sufficient. Having the temperament and moral courage to account for all relevant facts and opinions when explaining the event, and following the facts wherever they lead are also necessary, but not sufficient. Moral courage is also essential to accept for responsibility for unintended behaviors and consequences. Moral courage is required to look clearly at, and discuss openly, one's own thoughts and feelings that resulted in unintended behavior and consequences. Almost everyone experiences increased emotional pain when looking at one's unintended behavior and consequences, and the related underlying thoughts and feelings. The essence of moral courage allows us to see the tough truth and take appropriate action in the face of increased emotional pain.

Conclusion: Hard Earned Satisfaction

Leaders can improve the performance of their organizations by improving their own leadership, through learning to implement Model II under increasingly stressful conditions. There is an abundance of good advice about *what* is required for improvement. Our advice focuses on *how* leaders can make the internal changes necessary to make use of the available advice. A set of changes we have found useful and sufficient require mastery of new intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior consistent with Model II.

Learning to use Model II is very hard, emotionally challenging work. Although hard, mastering Model II is possible and worthwhile. In our research on over a hundred people who have invested at least a year and sufficient commitment in learning Model II, all reported that it was very hard but very worthwhile. All experienced significant, intermittent increases in emotional discomfort, which caused physical tiredness and ambivalence toward the learning, during the year. All reported both an increase in professional effectiveness, which was verified by 360-degree surveys, and an increase in personal satisfaction.

Every time a leader began mastering Model II two things were observed: (a) the leader's direct reports noted improvement in their leader's performance, and (b) communication, cooperation, coordination, and morale in the leader's team improved significantly, according to those below in the organization, and confirmed by our private, confidential interviews and analysis of audiotapes. Every time a senior team began mastering Model II and improved its communication, coordination, and cooperation, the organization improved its performance against its most important objectives, e.g., time to market,

customer satisfaction, and utilization of shared technology across functional groups. In all such cases, people who were interviewed privately and confidentially, said that trust was improved, they felt more empowered; they felt they had appropriate influence on the decisions that most affected them, and they had better visibility on the larger perspective that impacted those decisions. They and their bosses were doing a better job of tackling the tough issues. Again, this was verified by our analysis of audiotape transcripts, analysis of two-column cases of key events, and interviewing of individuals.

Implementing good advice is possible. When implemented, performance improves. The hard part is producing the personal learning necessary to implement good advice. The learning takes a big commitment, and it requires tolerating significant, intermittent increases in emotional discomfort. However, successful learning results in improved individual and organizational performance, as well as improvement in personal satisfaction.

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